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ALEX LASCARIDES and JON OBERLANDER
TEMPORAL COHERENCE AND
DEFEASIBLE KNOWLEDGE*
We discuss data involving the temporal structure of connected discourse.
Questions are raised about the relation between clause order in discourse
and causal order in the world, and about the coherence of certain discourses.
We maintain that interpretation is contextually influenced by knowledge of
the world and of pragmatics, and that the role of this knowledge should
be formalised via a defeasible logic. It transpires that a constrained set of
reasoning patterns underlies the retrieval of certain temporal structures. Not
all defeasible logics capture the set; the data help choose between candidate
logics. We demonstrate that an adequate logic characterises when a text is
temporally coherent, reliable and unambiguous relative to the context. We
also discuss defeasible reasoning in language generation, and some conse-
quences for the semantic-pragmatics relation.
1. In t roduct ion
An account of text interpretation must answer the following ques-
tion. Given the way events are described in the text, what are their causal
and temporal relations in interpretation? And similarly, an account of text
generation must answer an analogous question. Given the causal and tem-
poral relations between events in a knowledge base, what are the ways
they can be described in text?
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Cambridge, in
January 1991, and at the Workshop on Discourse Coherence, held in Edinburgh, in
April 1991, under the auspices of the European Community Basic Research Action in
Dialogue and Discourse. We thank Nick Asher, Mimo Caenepeel, Herb Clark, Dick
Crouch, Robert Dale and Victor Poznanski for helpful discussions on the ideas
reported here. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of UK Science and
Engineering Research Council through project grant GR/G 22077. HCRC is supported
by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.
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2 Alex Lascarides and Jon Oberlander
This paper has five basic goals. First, we wish to indicate a range
of data involving the temporal structure of connected discourse; there, the
main issues concern the relation between the order of clauses in a discourse
and the order of eventualities in the world, and the coherence (or otherwise)
of certain discourses. Secondly, we wish to show how a system (human
or artificial) can exploit knowledge of the world, and of pragmatics, to
resolve problems in the data. Thirdly, we aim to formalise the role of that
knowledge via a defeasible logic. Fourthly, we aim to choose between dif-
ferent possible logics for defeasible reasoning; not all candidates can capture
the range of reasoning patterns we require. Lastly, we wish to discuss the
role of defeasible reasoning in generating connected discourse, and its effect
on semantic structure. A general consequence of our discussion is the fol-
lowing. Defeasible reasoning can be used to model the pragmatic inter-
pretation of text, over and above its semantic interpretation; or it can be
used to choose among several possible semantic representations of text; or
it can be used dynamically to construct the semantic structure of text.
2. Data, definitions and intended coverage
In this section, we will first outline the three basic types of temporal
data we wish to discuss, then introduce some terminology intended to clarify
the discussion, and finally note various limitations on the coverage of the
approach to be elaborated in this paper.
2.1 Reversals, incoherence and ambiguity
The three pairs of texts that follow exemplify the first of the three
basic categories of data that we wish to address.
(1) Max stood up. John greeted him.
(2) Max fell. John pushed him.
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(4) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
(5) Max took an aspirin. He was sick.
(6) Max took an overdose of aspirin. He was sick.
These examples expose a puzzle concerning the relation between the de-
scription of events and their temporal order in the world: the syntactic
structure of the sentences cannot fully determine this relation. The sentences
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in texts (1) and (2), for example, have similar syntax. The natural inter-
pretation of (1) has the descriptive order of events match their temporal
order. However, in introducing this problem to the literature, Moens (1987:
92) notes that in cases like (2), descriptive order mismatches temporal order.
Indeed, if (1) were meant to describe a situation where the greeting occurred
before Max stood up, then at best it would be misleading. At least, it would
be misleading unless the reader already knows, from the extra-linguistic or
linguistic context in which (1) is uttered, that the greeting occurred before
Max stood up. Texts (3) and (4) also have similar syntax. But the natural
interpretation of (3) has the state of darkness temporally overlap the event of
Max opening the door; whereas in (4) the event of Max switching off the
light precedes the darkness.
Existing treatment of tense, such as Kamp and Rohrer (1983), Partee
(1984) and Hinrichs (1986) account for the forward movement of time in (1)
by encoding in logical form the temporal order between the events con-
cerned. This logical form is built solely from the syntactic structure of the
text's sentences. None of these theories attempt to account for the apparent
backward movement of time in (2), since they are concerned only with
narrative texts like (1), (3), (4) and (6). But even within the narrative domain,
the account isn't quite complete, in that they don't predict that the preferred
reading of (3) is different from (4). In extending the theories to account for
the above texts, it would be necessary to assign (1) a distinct logical form
from (2), in spite of the similar syntax of the sentences. This would involve
extensive revisions to the way logical form is constructed.
Dowty's (1986) treatment of tense also deals only with narrative texts.
The only basis for distinguishing temporal structures in this theory is the
event/state distinction. To extend Dowty's account to explain the difference
between (1) and (2) would require additional structures, because both texts
refer to events alone. Webber (1988) can account for the backward move-
ment of time in (2). However, her theory is unable to predict that, given
a context, mismatching the descriptive order and temporal order of events is
misleading in some cases (e.g. (1)) but not in others (e.g. (2)).
It might be thought that a simple solution is to say that there is some
"default" principle working along the following lines. Unless there is causal
information about the eventualities, descriptive order matches temporal
order. When there is causal information which somehow "overrides" this
principle, descriptive order mismatches temporal order. But the existence of
pairs such as (5) and (6) indicates that causal information need not have this
effect. In (5), we have the intuition that the sickness leads to the taking of
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4 Alex Lascarides and Jon Oberlander
aspirin; but in (6), we have the intuition that it is the overdose that causes the
sickness, rather than vice versa. To handle such case, the simple solution
would need to be made considerably more precise.
The second main category of data we wish to consider involves, in
one way or another, the idea of incoherence.
(7) ?Max won the race. He was home with the cup.
(8) Max won the race. He arrived home with the cup.
The query in (7) is meant to indicate a question about its acceptability. We
believe that it is less good than (8); and that its relative unacceptability is
not to be traced to the grammatical or semantic unacceptability of either
member of the pair. Rather, the problem lies in the juxtaposition of the
two sentences: we have the intuition that the state mentioned in the second
sentence of (7) cannot really overlap with the event mentioned in the pre-
ceding sentence. And yet the overlap is somehow implied by the fact that
the event and state are described consecutively in the particular way featured
in (7). The problem goes away when we replace the state-description with
an event- description.
The third category of data involves the idea of ambiguity. Given
the way thermostats work, the events described in (9) could conceivably
be related in one of two ways: either the strip changing shape caused the
temperature fall; or the temperature fall caused the strip to change shape.
(9) The bimetallic strip changed shape. The temperature fell.
It has been suggested, however, that there may be empirical evidence to
support the following conjecture. Readers don't interpret texts like (9) as
ambiguous, even if they have no prior knowledge of the temporal order of
events described.
On a more general level, however, there is a sense in which ambiguity
does arise. A text can correspond to different temporal structures with
respect to different contexts of interpretation, as defined by the reader's KB.
For example, the reader can infer that the linguistic order and temporal
order match in (2) if she already knows that the falling preceded the pushing;
but she infers that the linguistic order and temporal order don't match in
(2) if she doesn't have this prior knowledge. Conversely, in the context
where the reader already knows the greeting preceded the standing up, the
descriptive order of (1) mismatches temporal order; but without this knowl-
edge, the descriptive order of (1) matches temporal order. Ambiguity thus
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arises in the sense that the same text can have different temporal structures
with respect to different contexts.
With regard to ambiguity, then, we will want a theory which can
do justice both to the evidence that interpreters don't detect ambiguity in
cases like (9); and to the general intuition that the context of interpretation
will strongly affect choice among possible temporal structures.
2.2 Some definitions
To describe what is going on in these cases, and in particular, to
make explicit what we mean by coherence, we now introduce some ter-
minology. Throughout, the term "eventualities" is used as in Bach (1986)
to cover both events and states. We define temporal coherence > temporal relia-
bility and temporal precision in terms of a set C of relations between event-
ualities. This set intuitively describes when two eventualities are connected.
The relations in Care: causation, the part/whole relation,1 temporal overlap,
and the immediately precedes relation (where iiel immediately precedes *2"
means that el and e2 stand in a causal or part/whole relation that is com-
patible with e1 temporally preceding e2)-2 The definitions are as follows:
Temporal Coherence
A text is temporally coherent if the reader can infer that at least one of
the relations in C holds between the eventualities described in the
sentences.
Temporal Realibility
A text is temporally reliable if one of the relations in C which the reader
infers to hold does in fact hold between the eventualities described in
the sentences.
Temporal Precision
A text is temporally precise if whenever the reader infers that one of
a proper subset of the relations in C holds between the eventualities
Later, we shall cash out the part/whole relation in terms of Moens and Steedman's
(1988) event ontology, where an event is associated with three parts: a preparatory
phase, a culmination and a consequent phase. So "^ is part of <?2" means that "e^ is part
of the preparatory phase or consequent phase of e2"·
We assume that an event e± precedes an event e2 if ^ 's culmination occurs before *2's. So
there are part/whole relations between e± and e2 that are compatible with e1 temporally
preceding <?2-
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described in the sentences, then she is also able to infer which of these
two relations holds.
Clearly these definitions bear on the idea of "textual truth" (cf. Kamp 1981).
Arguably, for a text to be true, it's not enough for its component sentences
to be true; the text must be coherent and reliable as well. There are some
obvious corollaries to the definitions. A text is temporally incoherent if the
natural interpretation of the text is such that there are no inferrable relations
between the events. A text is temporally misleading, or as we shall say,
unreliable if the natural interpretation of the text is such that the inferred
relations between the events differ from their actual relations in the world.
Roughly, the reader can only infer the wrong member (s) of the set C,
given what she knows. In addition, a text is temporally imprecise, or as
we shall say, ambiguous, if the natural interpretation of the text is such that
the reader knows that one of a proper subset of relations in C holds between
the eventualities, but the reader can't infer which of this proper subset holds.
It follows from the above definitions that a text can be coherent
but unreliable. For example, if John greets Max and then Max stands up,
then (1) is coherent but unreliable. At least, it's unreliable unless the reader
already knows John greeted Max and then Max stood up, before she cal-
culates the temporal structure of (1). On the other hand, in an example
like (7), there may be no question about reliability because we cannot es-
tablish a temporal or causal relation between the two eventualities.
2.3 Caveats about coverage
With these notions in place, we can say that we wish to provide an
account for data which involve temporal coherence, reliability and ambi-
guity. By showing how to calculate when a text has these properties, we
hope to show how to solve the puzzles involving the texts in (1)—(9).
However, before proceding any further, we should note some pro-
visos concerning the intended coverage of this paper. First, we discuss
only local coherence, not global coherence. That is to say: we consider the
constraints on temporal coherence holding between two consecutive sen-
tences in a text.3 We shall therefore not be concerned with constraints on
Note that our use of these terms therefore differs from that in Hobbs (1985), where the
local coherence of an utterance is determined by its relation to the whole surrounding
discourse, and its global coherence by the utterance's relations to discourse,
conversational plans, and world knowledge.
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the relations between sentences separated from one another by intervening
material. To address these, we would have to have available some notion
of hierarchical discourse structure, as in Hobbs (1985), Grosz and Sidner
(1986), Mann and Thompson (1987), Scha and Polanyi (1988), or Webber
(1991).
Secondly, we discuss only temporallcausal relations, not discourse- struc-
tural relations. This is riot because we believe that temporal coherence is
sufficient for discourse coherence; we don't. It is because we have chosen
to present the argument for defeasible logic in a framework without full
discourse structure. As a result, there will be many cases where a pair of
sentences appears to be temporally coherent, but fails to achieve discourse
coherence, and the current account cannot explain what is wrong with
them (cf. Caenepeel 1991 for a discussion of such cases). On the one hand,
our discussion here can be seen as extending in certain ways the account
in Lascarides (1990). On the other hand, Lascarides and Asher (1991 a,
1991b) extend the treatment of temporal relations explored here so as to
permit the expression of discourse-structural, or rhetorical, relations, and
thereby address the issue of non-local coherence. One way of expressing
the difference between our treatment here and the fuller account which
builds on it is to say that the binary relation between text and temporal
structure characterised here is extended to a tertiary relation between text,
temporal structure and discourse structure. The similarity lies in the fact
that the reader's defeasible knowledge plays a central role in defining both
relations.
A third proviso that should be registered is that cases of unmarked
reversal are rare. By an unmarked reversal, we mean texts where the order
in which events are described mismatches their order of occurrence, and
this mismatch is unmarked by any syntactic indicators (such as the use of
the perfect, or because). This may help explain the air of artificiality which
surrounds the minimal pairs we have discussed. However, we argue below
that combining the defeasible knowledge account with a simple generation
model permits a natural explanation of the unnaturalness of the invented
examples. In spite of this, worries may remain about the soundness of pro-
ceding from our minimal decontextualised cases.4 The ubiquity of real con-
text — linguistic and extra-linguistic — might make us feel that subjects
confronted with our examples are like fish out of water, and their actions
Herb Clark has pursued this point in conversation.
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are inappropriate. Against this, we would argue that one of the major ad-
vantages of our account is that it provides a rather precise explanation of
the differences in interpretation which arise as contexts are enriched, and
made more natural. More specifically, our framework is rich enough to
explain that the preferred reading in (10) is one where the pushing caused
the falling, but in (11) the preferred reading is one where the falling caused
the pushing.
(10) Max had a horrible accident yesterday. He fell. John pushed him.
(11) John and Max were at the edge of the cliff. Max felt a sharp blow
to the back of his neck. He fell. John pushed him. Max rolled over
the edge of the cliff.
This is because we exploit non-monotonic inference; and thus enlargement
of the linguistic and extra-linguistic context can lead to changes in the
temporal relations which are inferred.
3. Strategy
So we wish to tackle data in which temporal coherence and reliability
are central problems. The standard approach to the semantics of the dis-
course constructs it from syntactic structure alone, and directly encodes
temporal relations. As we have noted, the data creates puzzles for such
approaches, if they are to be extended to deal with non-narrative texts. A
very natural question, however, arises. Tf coherence and reliability aren't
fixed by syntactic structure, where are they fixed?
The answer we wish to explore here is that these properties are
fixed by a defeasible logic, which takes relatively simple semantic forms
together with other knowledge sources, and infers the temporal/causal re-
lations. A defeasible logic is one in which conclusions may follow from a
set of premises, but not from a superset. Differing aspects of the approach
have certainly been reconnoitred before. On the one hand, the idea that
world knowledge can be used to guide discourse interpretation dates back
to Aristotle, and has more recently been defended by Hobbs (1979, 1985)
and Dahlgren (1988).5 On the other hand, the utility of defeasible logic
Aristotle (1984) distinguishes valid reasoning about scientific propositions (Posterior
Analytics] and dialectic about the opinions of men (Topics). In Rhetoric^ he describes
how the construction of persuasive argument is dependent on knowledge of more or
less generally held opinions.
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for pragmatic interpretation has been explored by Appelt and Konolige
(1988), Wainer and Maida (1990) and Crouch and Poznanski (1991).
3. / The need for defeasible logic
In certain respects, the approach developed in the current paper
refines that outlined by Hobbs and Dahlgren. In Hobbs' approach, the
causal knowledge is encoded in a declarative but indefeasible knowledge
representation. In Dahlgren's approach, the relevant knowledge is encap-
sulated in terms of episodic knowledge representation. One difference from
Hobbs is that we place more emphasis on defeasibility; and one difference
from Dahlgren is that we place more emphasis on the need to declaratively
specify the relations between the representations. The main difference from
both approaches, in fact, lies in the utilization of a constrained representation
of defeasible knowledge, in which the underlying relation of logical con-
sequence yields the interactions required.
In Hobbs' and Dahlgren's theories as they stand, it is not completely
clear that the requisite notion of logical consequence could be defined,
since there are no obvious relations between defeasible laws that ought to
interact in certain specific ways. Why should this matter? The reason is
that conflicts certainly arise among the knowledge sources their theories
recruit, but there is no mechanical way of resolving such conflict. For
example, Hobbs (1979) uses causal knowledge to choose the antecedent to
the pronoun in text (12); that knowledge is still relevant to text (13), but
further conflicting knowledge overrides it. As a result, a different antecedent
to the pronoun is chosen.
(12) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination.
(13) John can open Bill's safe. He must change the combination.
Equally, Dahlgren (1988) represents linguistic knowledge concerning how
textual order affects the temporal structure of the events described. This
knowledge explains the difference between (1) and (14); but in the analysis
of (2), it is overridden by conflicting world knowledge concerning the typi-
cal causal relation between falling and pushing.
( 1 ) Max stood up. John greeted him.
(14) John greeted Max. He stood up.
( 2) Max fell. John pushed him.
In both theories, the problem is that particular resolutions of conflict among
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knowledge sources appear arbitrary; they lack logical justification, given
the way the knowledge is represented.
The current work can therefore be seen as building on that of Hobbs
and Dahlgren by placing causal knowledge in a logical context where its
defeasible implications can be precisely calculated. In this connection, the
work which is closest in spirit to ours is that of Crouch and Poznanski
(1991): they take care to ensure that the logical consequence relation has
the inferential properties they require. They differ in encoding defeasible
conditions directly into semantic representation, and in considering the
retrieval of temporal relations in /Vz/ra-sentential cases.
3.2 Choosing the right logic
Our specific strategy has evolved from Lascarides (1990). There, it
was proposed that the relation between the descriptive order of events in
text and their temporal order can be characterised in terms of two sets of
defeasible rules. The first set represents preferences for causal relations among
events and states (world knowledge) and the second set represents linguistic
rules concerning Gricean-style pragmatic maxims (linguistic knowledge).
This theory provides a simple account of the difference between discourses
in which descriptive order matches temporal order, and those which don't.
Sometimes, world knowledge (encoded as a defeasible preference for a
causal direction) "overrode" the linguistic knowledge.
Λ declarative formal model was then developed, based on Levcsque's
(1990) autoepistemic logic for defeasible reasoning, which allowed different
natural interpretation for texts with similar syntax. However, Levesque's
logic as it stands does not support certain defeasible inferences that can
potentially be exploited to define the temporal structure of text. Hence,
even if it is accepted that we require a logic for defeasible reasoning, a
further question remains: which is the right logic? One of our goals is there-
fore to determine an answer to this question; to choose between candidate
logics.
33 Defeasible Patterns
We would argue that any defeasible logic will be adequate so long
as it captures the patterns set out in Figure 1. The reason is that all these
patterns are required on the model of textual interpretation we hold.
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Defeasible Modus Ponens
Birds fly bird(tweety)
fly(tweety)
Resolvable Conflict
The Nixon Diamond
Weakening the Consequent
0 K?y
I Qy Birds fly© Birds fly or walk
The Penguin Principle
Key
Penguins
Wtfly
penguin(tweety)
penguin(tweety)
bird(tweety)
-ifly(tweety)
fly(tweety)
Key
bachelor(harry) Λ over40(/iarry)
bachelor(harry)
over40(harry)
-unarried(harry)
married(harry)
) Λ republican(nixon)
republican(nixon)
Key
Θ
\&J pacifist(nixon)
Dudley Doorite
Republicans are pacifists
and quakers are pacifists
Republicans and quakers
are pacifists
ι ϊ
Fig. 1. A Pictorial Representation of Defeasible Inference
In this and subsequent figures, bold arrows correspond to indefeas-
itle rules, and thin arrows to defeasible rules; circles correspond to prop-
ositions that feature in rules in the KB and double circles indicate which
propositions will actually be inferred in the KB, given an adequate defeasible
logic. The cross-hatching between some circles indicates that the relevant
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propositions are contradictory. In the Nixon Diamond pattern, the lack of
double circles indicates that neither of the contradictory conclusions are
drawn from the premises.
The patterns in Figure 1 are illustrated there in terms of more or less
familiar examples from the knowledge representation literature. The reason
we provide these graphical analogues is that they constitute a means of
representing the main differences between the patterns, without requiring
detailed specifications of the possible logics. For those familiar with
defeasible logics, it is probably easier actually to follow the connexions
between the formulae themselves. If so, then replace the thin arrows with the
defeasible consequence relation which we represent as >; and replace thick
arrows with the indefeasible connective -». In summary, the difference
between Defeasible Modus Ponens and the Penguin Principle is that in the
latter pattern, a new premise is introduced, which can act as antecedent to
a second defeasible rule. The consequents of the two rules conflict.
However, the new premise indefeasibly implies the old one; because of this,
we shall say that it is more specific, and we say that the rule which requires the
more specific premise is more specific than the other rule. We want a defeasible
logic to validate a pattern in which the more specific rule is preferred; this
pattern turns out to be central to accounting for temporal reversals. The
pattern of Resolvable Conflict is very similar to the Penguin Principle,
except that the premises are no longer logically related, and one of the
competing rules is indefeasible. This time, we want a logic to validate the
conclusion of the indefeasible rule. The Nixon Diamond arises when we
alter the Resolvable Conflict pattern to make both competing rules
defeasible. We want a logic that draws neither of the two competing
conclusions. Finally, the two patterns of Weakening and Dudley Doorite are
indefeasible, and relatively straightforward.
There are logics of defeasible reasoning that validate these patterns
of common sense entailment. Asher and Morreau (1991) present a logic
called MASH, where the patterns of reasoning arise from the semantics of
the defeasible rules themselves. Hierarchical Autoepistemic logic (HAEL)
(Moore 1985, Appelt and Konolige 1988) captures the Penguin Principle
by ordering the defeasible rules according to a taxonomic hierarchy, so
that the rules with the more specific antecedents have priority over the
rules with the less specific antecedents. There, the Penguin Principle is
captured by a mechanism that is external to the semantics of defeasible
rules. We do not aim to choose between these different approaches here.
We will merely explore how the patterns of inference in Figure 1 contribute
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to local temporal coherence, reliability and precision. Our discussion below
will indicate that a formalisation of the defeasible reasoning approach to
temporal semantics is possible in either MASH or HAEL. A formalisation in
MASH of some of the ideas presented here appears in Lascarides and Asher
(1991).
4. Reversals: the basic story
Before indicating precisely why a defeasible logic needs to include all
the patterns in Figure 1, and how they arise in each case, it is probably helpful
to sketch the general form of the explanations we will be pursuing. Let us
therefore turn to the first pair of examples: the orderly (1), and the
"reversal", (2):
(1) Max stood up. John greeted him.
(2) Max fell. John pushed him.
It seems not unreasonable to suggest that in the second case, what makes the
difference is that we have a piece of general knowledge which tells us that if
we have a falling and pushing on our hands, it's more likely to happen one
way than another. We would like to say that world knowledge (WK) includes
some sort of law-like generalisation gained from perception and experience
that relates falling and pushing in this way (in what follows, such
generalisations will numbered so that their relation to the linguistic examples
is reasonably obvious):
Causal Law 2
Connected events et where χ falls and e2 where j pushes χ are
normally such that e2 causes e ^ .
The generalisation is law-like in the familiar sense that it is not merely an
accidentally true generalisation; it could therefore support subjunctive
conditional claims. Note that there is no similar law for standing up and
greeting. Our "law" is defeasible, in the familiar sense that additional
information can prevent its conclusion from following. Such generalisations
are standardly termed ceterisparibus laws-, they hold true, other things being
equal. If we have information which contradicts the explicit premises, the
conclusion need not follow. Now, at first glance, it seems reasonable to say
that something like this law is relevant when interpreting text (2). If we have
decided not to encode the temporal/causal relation between the two
sentences as part of their semantics, then Law 2 might allow us to infer the
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relation. But this cannot be the whole story; if the semantics is neutral for the
sentences in (2), then it should also be neutral for (1). But there is no piece of
WK which will help us infer the temporal/causal structure relating the
eventualities mentioned in (1). Something else must do the job. Intuitively, it
could be a piece of knowledge about language use like the following:
Narration
A text segment α . β (where α and β are sentences) that is temporally
coherent is normally such that the eventuality described in α immedi-
ately precedes the eventuality described in β.
The relation "e^ immediately precedes e2" in the above is interpreted as (iel
and e2 stand in a causal or part/whole relation and e1 temporally precedes e2".
If e^ and e2 are events, then e1 temporally precedes e2 (written e^ -< e2) if *i's
culmination occurs before e2s culmination. So there are part/whole relations
between the eventualities e± and e2 that are compatible with e1<e2.
Although we call the above rule Narration, the title is perhaps
unfortunate, since it would not be used only in the narrative genre, if such
a genre could be stably defined. Equally, it is not meant to be "the" default,
casting all text in the image of narrative, unless there is information to the
contrary. It's just a piece of linguistic knowledge (LK) that may help us
retrieve temporal structure, so long as we're prepared to assume that the text
is temporally coherent.
Plausible reasons for proposing this piece of knowledge are three-
fold. It will - for some text genres at least - correspond to the Dowtian
protagonist's "order of discovery" (cf. Dowty 1986). In such genres, a
narrator typically describes events in the order in which the protagonist
views them: the temporal order predicted by Narration. But more generally,
it will sometimes be the case that the only information available to an
interpreter regarding temporal structure will be textual order. Take a case in
which no information about the temporal structure of events is derivable
from WK or clue words like because or adverbials. Then the descriptive order
of the events provides the only vital clue which can be used to construct the
model of what the text describes. In such cases, our rule will be the only thing
available. Arguably, in the more general version of our approach, these cases
will indeed be rare, since the interpreter will have information available
about discourse structure (cf. Lascarides and Asher 1991b). In any case, the
rule provides a means for an interpreter to exploit a co-operative text-
generator, who has observed Grice's (1975) maxim of manner, and chosen
one of several ways to "be orderly".
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/30/13 10:20 AM
Temporal coherence and defeasible knowledge 15
In essence, this story about the rule of Narration suggests that the
theory should represent Grice's pragmatic maxims as defeasible rules. Such
an approach to pragmatics has been suggested in, for instance, Joshi,
Webber and Weischedel (1984), and Wainer and Maida (1990).
5. The Context of Interpretat ion
The general proposal, then, is that we have a set of defeasible rules
available, some expressing WK, others expressing LK. A defeasible logic will
then apply these rules to semantic structures, and generate temporal/causal
structures for a text. In order to procede to the details of the proposal, we
need firstly to put in place some terminology. This should allow a precise, yet
general, representation for defeasible rules, and secondly a more exact
specification of what an interpreter brings to a text.
5.1 Representation of default rules
We do not intend tp provide here a full account of the truth
conditions of the defeasible rules. We instead wish to emphasise that the
ideas presented here are neutral between specific formalisations of defeasible
reasoning - so long as the logic can support the patterns we have suggested.
However, we will need to assume a certain syntactic structure to the rules
and show how the reasoning patterns introduced earlier are syntactically
structured, in order to calculate which defeasible inferences underly
temporal semantics.
We will represent the default condition as >, so φ > tp is read as
"Other things being equal, if φ then ψ", φ > ψ is the way defeasible rules
are represented in MASH. But for the purposes of this paper, φ > ψ can
be considered syntactic sugar for φ Λ ι Β \ψ —> ψ where Β is a modal
belief operator, which is how default rules are represented in HAEL; or
φ Λ Μψ —> ψ where Μ is Reiter's consistency operator; or φ —> norm-
ally (\p) which is how default rules are represented in Update Semantics
(Veltman 1989). The defeasible conditional IfTweety is a bird then Tweety flies,
if things are normal will be represented as bird(tweety) > fly(tweety)? We will
For the sake of simplicity we will not be concerned with the way quantifiers are
represented in the defeasible rules; these have no bearing on the defeasible rules for
temporal interpretation since they will be prepositional.
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represent all indefeasible laws as modal conditionals of the form D (φ -» ψ).
Penguins are birds will thus be represented as D (Vx)(penguin (x) -> bird(x))
for example. Such conditionals have a well-defined semantics in MASH, HAEL
and in Reiter's logic.
Furthermore, let <α, /?) mean that the text α . β is temporally
coherent; see assumption (ii) in the next subsection. <^a, /?) will entail that
the events described in α and β are causally or temporally related somehow.
Finally, let me (a) be a term that refers to the main eventuality described by
a.7 For example, the main eventuality for Max fell is the event e of Max
falling.
5.2 Assumptions about the knowledge base
The assumptions we make about the premises or knowledge base
(KB) when interpreting text are the following:
(i) The semantics of the sentences α and β, which form part of the KB, do
not impose any conditions on the temporal order of the events they
describe.
(ii) The reader assumes that text is locally temporally coherent, and so
<a, /?> is part of the KB.
(iii) All defeasible WK, such as the above causal law, and LK, such as
Narration, is part of the KB.
(iv) All indefeasible laws, such as Penguins are birds and Causes Precede
Effects are part of the KB.
(v) The laws of logic are part of the KB.
On our account, then, this is all that an interpreter brings to a discourse.
Obviously, any claims to psychological reality would have to be taken with
a large pinch of salt, if only in view of assumption (v). In the next section, we
will show how a model making these assumptions about an interpreter's KB
can get the right structures for reversed and non-reversed texts.
me(OL) is formally defined in Lascarides and Asher (1991 b) in a way that agrees with
intuitions.
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6. The Penguin Principle and reversals
We will consider in turn the first three pairs of two-sentence texts
introduced at the beginning of the paper. The first pair both involve
sentences describing events; the second pair both involve describing an
event and a state; the third pair both involve events and states, where more
than one causal law is brought into play.
6.1 Events and causation
So; how do we account for the pair (1) and (2), and the differences
between them?
(1) Max stood up. John greeted him.
(2) Max fell. John pushed him.
The story about (1) turns out to be quite simple. The only rule in our KB
when interpreting (1) whose antecedent is satisfied is the following one
(iprec(me(vi)yme( )) stands for "me(a) immediately precedes me( )"):
Narration
<a, j > > iprec(me(K\ me ( β ) )
In the light of this rule, the KB gives the pattern of Defeasible Modus Ponens,
as shown in Figure 2.
Τ Θ «".ΛNarration ^=ς χ '
* (2) me(a) Χ me( )
Fig. 2. Narration
Defeasible Modus Ponens yields the conclusions from the premises
that the main event described in a, i. e. Max standing up, precedes the main
event described in β, i.e. John greeting him. This agrees with intuitions.
However, as the basic story suggested, the account of (2) is more complex,
and it turns out to be characteristic of all the cases we have labelled
"reversals". (2) looks like (1), except for the lexical variations. This time,
however, Narration is not the only relevant rule; we also have Causal Law 2.
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To represent it formally, we introduce a predicate r such that r(e^ e2)
means that the events ei and e2 are temporally or causally connected somehow.
For our purposes, r(e^e2} can be viewed as asserting that one of a
constrained list of possible event connections holds:
(a) e1 causes e2 or e2 causes e^.
(b) e1 is part of the preparatory phase of e2 or e2 is part of the preparatory
phase of e±.
(c) ev is part of the consequent phase of e2 or e2 is part of the consequent
phase of e1.
(d) e± and e2 temporally overlap.
(e) e± immediately precedes e2 or e2 immediately precedes e^.
So r (tf l5 e2) holds just in case e± and e2 are connected by one of the relations in
the set C introduced earlier. We now represent Causal Law 2 as follows:
Causal Law 2
(r(ei> ^2) Λ /# // (/ffrfx, e^ Λ push (John, max, e2)) > cause (e2, e·^)
This is a relatively simple rule: if the three premises are satisfied by the KB
including the semantic structures for the sentences of the discourse, then
ceteris paribus, we will conclude that the pushing caused the falling. The
limitation of the rule to describing Max and John is purely exegetical; it is
important to note that even a more general version of the rule should not be
read as claiming that pushings normally cause fallings. There will be plenty
of pushings around that don't cause fallings; and there may well be plenty of
fallings that cause pushings. The point is that //a pushing and falling are
connected, then although both causal directions may be permissable, the KB
normally prefers one to the other.8 The second and third premise of the
antecedent of Causal Law 2 are verified by the KB when interpreting (2),
because we can assume that the semantics of the two sentences α and β entail
fall (max, me (^Y) and push (John, max, me (β)). This would follow directly
This is not the place to enter into the metaphysics of causality; we are only trying to
represent a language user's causal preferences. However, at least some philosophical
accounts suggest that As cause .os when As probabilise Bs. In particular, when an
A does not occur, the probability of Β is lower than when an A does occur. These are
by no means the only views in the literature, but there is much to commend them.
Suffice it for now that our representation of a language user's beliefs about causal
relations is compatible with such accounts.
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from the intuitive definition of the function me and the following DRT-type
logical forms for the sentences in (2).9
(a) [ely /!][/! -< now, hold(ev, t ^ , fall (max, ej\
( ) [e2> f2][*2 ^ now* hold(e2, t2], push (John, max, e2)\
In words, a introduces an event e± and time /x where /x is earlier than the time
of speech now, and the event ev of Max falling holds at the time /x. /? is the
same save that the event is John pushing Max. These logical forms impose
no relations between e1 and e2.
But the question remains: is ti\z first premise of Causal Law 2 satisfied
by the KB? As things stand, we have not said whether the KB contains the
assumption r (ely e2). However, we can show that in both MASH and HAEL it
does; and hence that the premises of the rule will be satisfied; and hence that
the conclusion follows, in the absence of information to the contrary.
The demonstration procedes as follows. Our definition of temporal
coherence provides the key: it yields the following indefeasible laws:
Definition of Coherence
D («α, β} v < ]8, α» <-> r(me(*\ me (β)})
G«a,jS> -* r (me (*), me (β)))
These indefeasible laws allow one to substitute the antecedent of Causal
Law 2 to yield the following as part of the KB:10
New Causal Law 2
<^oc, y Λ fall (max, me(ti)) Λ push (John, max, me (β)) > cause (me (β),
The antecedent of New Causal Law 2 is satisfied by te KB in interpreting (2).
So is Narration's. The antecedent of New Causal Law 2 entails that of
Narration (by D ((φ Λ φ) -> φ)). Now, the conclusions of these laws
conflict in the light of the indefeasible law that causes precede effects:
These are the forms adopted in Lascarides (1990) and Lascarides and Asher (1991 a,
1991 b). Note that the logical forms of (l)'s sentences would be the same, save that fall
znapush are replaced by standup and greet. We are not here concerned with committing
ourselves to a specific logical form of sentences like Max fell. The examples are simply
meant to illustrate that logical forms with the required properties are available.
Similarly, there is also rule <β, α> /\fail(max, me (et)) /\pusk(john^ max, me( )) >
cause(me( ), r»e((x)) indicating that regardless of the order in which the pushing and
falling are described, the defeasible preference is that the pushing caused the falling.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.224.45
Download Date | 5/30/13 10:20 AM
20 Alex Lascarides and Jon Oberlander
Causes Precede Effects
Thus the defeasible rules in the KB don't quite form a Penguin Principle: the
conlusions of the conflicting laws are not p and \p. Nevertheless a
"Complex" Penguin Principle is formed. In this case, the laws conflict in the
context of Causes Precede Effects and so more specific laws win, just as in the
Penguin example: see Figure 3.
KeyΘ (α,/?) Λ /α//(τηαζ,me(a)) Λ
push(john, max, me( )
Narration
*5?
Causal Law 2
PI Causes Precede
[Effects
(2)
GDΘ
/T\
(α,/3) Λ fall(max,me(a)) Λ
push(john, mox, me(/?)
<a»^>
catise(me(/3), me(a)
-ime(a) -< me( )
me(a) ·< me( )
Fig. 3. Explanation
If the logic supports the Complex Penguin Principle, then the
conclusion gained is that the pushing caused the falling, as required.11
A more direct route to the Complex Penguin would be to restate Causal
Law 2 directly as New Causal Law 2. This would avoid having to infer New
Causal Law 2 in order to obtain the Penguin Principle pattern of reasoning
required. In essence, instead of characterising causal laws as representing
only WK, we would represent causal laws as a mixture of WK and LK. In
words, New Causal Law 2 asserts that if the sentences are temporally
coherent then there is a connection between the events; and given the kinds
of events they are, the second event described caused the first, if things are
normal. For the sake of simplicity, we will represent the causal laws directly
as a mixture of WK and LK, as in New Causal Law 2.
Lascarides and Asher (1991 b) show that MASH validates the Complex Penguin
Principle. HAEL also does so, since the default rules will be ordered in the hierarchy
according to the specificity of their antecedents.
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It must be stressed that the reasoning pattern, and the temporal
structure associated with (2), are dependent on the reader's KB. Suppose we
add to that KB a further premise, stating that the falling preceded the
pushing. Then the pattern of inference is different from a Complex Penguin;
the consequent of New Causal Law 2 is not inferred, because it is
inconsistent with the facts already held in the KB. Instead, only one
remaining defeasible rule has its antecedent verified: Narration. It's therefore
used to infer that the falling immediately preceded the pushing. So (2) is not
always interpreted as a reversal. Rather, in the absence of information to the
contrary', (2) is interpreted as a reversal. By contrast, (1) is interpreted as
a narrative, in the absence of information to the contrary.
In summary, then, the natural interpretations of (1) and (2) can be
formally distinguished; this even though their sentences are assigned similar
logical forms. The basis for the distinction was a defeasible causal law whose
antecedent was verified by (2) but not by (1). Because of this, the premises in
interpreting (1) and (2) formed different patterns of defeasible inference;
Defeasible Modus Ponens for (1) and the Penguin Principle for (2).
6.2 States and causation
Now, it turns out that the Penguin Principle also plays a crucial role
in event-state pairs. Take (3), where we have the intuition that there is no
causal link between the event and state described.
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
Suppose the logical forms of the sentences in (3) are respectively α and β.
Then the appropriate KB for the analysis of (3) contains a, /?, <(a, /?) and all
the defeasible and indefeasible laws mentioned above. In addition we claim
that the following defeasible piece of LK holds and is therefore contained in
the KB:
States Overlapl
<oc, ]3> Λ state (me (β}) > overlap (me (a), me (β)}
In words, when a temporally coherent segment of text α . β describes a state
and we have no knowledge about how that state is related to other
eventualities - gained from WK or syntactic markers like because and therefore
- we assume that they temporally overlap.
This law can be seen as a manifestation of Grice's Maxim of
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Relevance — as suggested in Lascarides (1990). To construct a full picture of
the situation described by NL text, the interpreter must infer the relative
occurrences of the states and the culminations of the events, including where
the states start and stop. Since culminations are punctual (holding at points
of time), their relative order is inferred from rules like Narration. This
models the fact that an author can typically describe eventualities in the order
of perception. But states are extended, and the order of perception of states
does not fully determine where the states start relative to the situation being
described. So simply relating events and states in the order in which the
protagonist views them does not in itself determine where the state starts.
There are several linguistic mechanisms which can be used to indicate where
a state starts relative to the other eventualities. The author could explicitly
refer in the text to what caused the state, and so from the law that causes
precede effects, the interpreter will know the relative place where the state
starts. This is what's going on in (4).
(4) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
Alternatively, the author can use temporal adverbials to say where a state
starts. But (3) shows that these two mechanisms are not enough: how do we
determine where states start in texts that do not feature adverbials or causes?
States Overlap is then a vital mechanism for determining where a state starts
relative to other eventualities described in text. It basically says that if there is
no "explicit" indication of where the state starts - via the mention of causes
or the use of temporal adverbials - then the start of the state is assumed to be
irrelevant. That is, the state started to hold before the situation that the text is
concerned with occurs, resulting in temporal overlap. States Overlap can be
viewed as a manifestation of the Maxim of Relevance, because it asserts that
(unless there is indication in the text ot the contrary) the point where a state
starts is assumed to be irrelevant.
We assume that the logical form of the second sentence in (3), namely
β, entails state (me (β)) by the classification of the predicate dark as Stative. So
the KB in the analysis of (3) verifies the antecedent to two defeasible laws:
Narration and States Overlap. Furthermore, these laws conflict in the
context of the following axiom that asserts that temporal overlap and
precedence are mutually exclusive:
Overlap/Precedence are Exclusive
n(Ve1e2)(over/ap(ei,e2) -> (—| (e1 <e2) A~I (*2-< ^)))
So the KB provides another instance of the Complex Penguin Principle, as
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shown in Figure 4. The temporal structure inferred for (3) is that the event
and state overlap, as required.
States Overlap
Key
Q (α, β) Λ state(me( ) )
(ϊ) (
(2) <«,«
\4j overlap(me(a)1 me( )
(y ->me(a) X me(/?)
@ me(a) X me( )
Fig. 4. States Without Causation
We now turn to the other case, where there is some causal link
between the event and the state. This time, the natural temporal interpreta-
tion is rather different: the event precedes the state.
(4) a. Max switched off the light.
b. The room was pitch dark.
Causal Law 4 below reflects the knowledge that the room being dark and
switching off the light, if connected, are normally such that the event causes
the state:12
Causal Law 4
<^a, /?} Λ switchoff(max, light :, me (sty Λ dark(room^ me (β})
> cause (me (a), me (β))
Suppose the logical forms of (4a) and (4b) are respectively α and β. Then the
KB when analysing (4) contains a, /?, <(a, /?)>, Causal Law 4, States Overlap
and Narration. The antecedents to these three defeasible laws are all verified
by the premises. Causal Law 4 conflicts with States Overlap, which in turn
conflicts with Narration. Causal Law 4 does not, however, conflict with
For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the problem of inferring that the light is in the
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Narration. Moreover, the antecedent of Causal Law 4 entails that of States
Overlap (by the Stative classification of the predicate dark), which entails that
of Narration. Pictorially, this is represented as in Figure 5.
Key
Causal Law 8
Causes Precede
Effects
(cc,ß) take(asp, max, rae(a))
A5tcfc(max, me(ß))
(a,/?) take(asp, max, me(a))
Asic/;(max, me(ß))
( ,/3) state(me(ß))vj9
<-,«
\&J cause(me(ß)1me(a))
(J )^ overlap(me(ß),me(a))
( ) -wie(a) X me(ß)
@ -.me(a) X me(/J)
(9) me(a) X me(^)
Fig. 5. States With Causation
It is apparent that the pattern involved is not quite a Complex
Penguin. So it isn't possible to tell at a glance whether a logic for defeasible
reasoning that supports the Penguin Principle will also support the inference
required from the above pattern, where the event in (4) causes the state. But
intuitively, the same principle that is exemplified by the Penguin Principle
should apply in the above. That is, the most specific defeasible law should
take priority over less specific ones. Lascarides and Asher (1991b) show that
conflict between defeasible rules is resolvable in MASH when the antecedent
of one rule entails that of all the others; the consequent of the most specific
rule holds, as required. In HAEL, since Causal Law 4 is the most specific
defeasible law, it would have the highest priority in the hierarchy. So once
again the logic will ensure that the law's consequent - that the event caused
the state - is inferred. Whether or not Narration also "fires" in the above will
depend on the particular details of the HAEL used.
6.3 Most specific cause
We have illustrated that the Penguin Principle can be used to "filter"
pragmatic maxims and causal laws so that only the appropriate event
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structures - the ones inferred from the more specific antecedents - are
inferred. In essence, this means that the reader never ignores information
that is derivable from the text and relevant to constructing the relations
between events. For example, if the antecedents of Narration and States
Overlap are both verified by the KB, then the Penguin Principle ensures that
the following information is not ignored: a stative expression was used
instead of an event expression.
Texts (5) and (6) demonstrate that the Penguin Principle can also filter
defeasible causal laws.
(5) a. Max took an aspirin,
b. He was sick.
(6) a. Max teok an overdose of aspirin,
b. He was sick.
Suppose the logical forms of (5a) and (4b) are al and β and the logical forms
of (6a) and (6b) are a2 and β. We assume that ax features the atomic formula
take(max, aspirin, e^}, β features sick(max, £2)> and a2 features the conjunc-
tion take (max, aspirin, e^ Λ overdose (e^. Thus the entailment from a2 to ax is
cashed out in the traditional Davidsonian way (cf. Davidson 1967).
Let's first consider the natural interpretation of (5). Causal Law 5
captures the knowledge that sickness and taking aspirin, if connected, are
normally such that the sickness caused one to take aspirin.
Causal Law 5
<a, /?> Λ take (aspirin, max, me (α)) Λ sick(wax, we (β))
> cause (me (β}, me(ti))
The KB in the analysis of (5) contains α1, β and {αΐ5 /?). Thus the antecedents
to Narration, States Overlap and Causal Law 5 are all satisfied (assuming that
sick is classified as stative). The antecedent to Causal Law 5 entails that of
States Overlap, which entails that of Narration. Moreover, Causal Law 5
conflicts with Narration in the context of the indefeasible law that Causes
Precede Effects. The premises thus form a pattern of defeasible reasoning
that is very like that for text (4), and the same remarks about the
expressiveness required from a default logic apply again. See Figure 6.
Now consider text (6). Again, the appropriate KB verifies the
antecedents of Causal Law 5, States Overlap and Narration. The antecedent
to Causal Law 6 is also verified:
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Key
Causal Law 8
Causes Precede
Effects
>^^
(ot,ß) take(asp, max, me(a))
f\sick(max, me(ß))
( , ) take(asp, max, me(a))
/\sick(max, me(ß))
(a,ß)hstate(me(ß))
jy cause(me(ß), me(a))
Gj overlap(me(ß), me(a))
j ) -ime(a) X me(ß)
-.me(a) X me(^)
me(a) ^C me(/5)
Fig. 6. Aspirin
Key
\2) (a, ) take(asp, max, me(a))A
od(me(a)) sick(max, me(ß))
\2j (a, ) take(asp,max,me(a))f\
od(rne(a)) aick(max,me(ß))
\3J (a, ) take(asp,max,me(a))A
sick(max,me(ß))
( ) ( , ) state(me(ß))
(£j cause(me(a), me(ß))
(Tj cause(me(ß), me(a))
{&) overlap(me(a), me(ß))
(9J me(a) X me(ß)
(10) -ime(a) -< me(ß)
Q-l) -ime(a) X me(ß)
(12) me(a) -< me(ß)
Fig. 7. Overdose
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Causal Law 6
<a, y Λ take (max, aspirin, me(ti)) Λ overdose (me (cC)) Λ sick(max, me (β))
> cause (me (ti), me( ))
Causal Law 6 reflects the defeasible knowledge that taking an overdose and
being sick, if connected, are normally such that the overdose caused the
sickness. The antecedent to Causal Law 6 entails that of Causal Law 5.
Moreover, Causal Law 6 conflicts with Causal Law 5 in the context that
Causes Precede Effects, and also conflicts with States Overlap. It does not,
however, conflict with Narration. Thus the premises in the KB form the
pattern in Figure 7. Again, the general principle — specific defeasible laws
override less specific ones - will yield the conclusion that we require, that the
event of taking an overdose in (6) caused the sickness. So if the logic for
defeasible reasoning captures this principle, then the account of temporal
interpretation presented here will capture an intuition: a reader never
ignores information that is salient in text when calculating the relations
between the events described. In (6) this means that the reader doesn't ignore
the crucial information that the taking of aspirin was an overdose.
7. The Nixon Diamond and Incoherence
7.1 Local incoherence
We now turn to the awkwardness of text (7), and compare it with the
acceptable (8).
(7) ?Max won the race. He was home with the cup.
(8) Max won the race. He arrived home with the cup.
The interpretation of (8) is similar to that of (1); an instance of Defeasible
Modus Ponens where the relevant defeasible law is Narration. The
awkwardness of (7) can be explained as follows. The defeasible law below
captures the WK that if Max wins the race and if Max is at home, then these
events don't temporally overlap, if things are normal. In other words, it is
unusual for the finish line of the race to be at the winner's house:
Law 7
win (max, race, e^) Λ athome(max, e2) > ι over lap (e^, e2)
Note that Law 7 does not require the antecedent to assert that the event and
state are connected. For the intuition Law 7 captures is that the event and
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state don't normally temporally overlap, regardless of whether they are
connected or not.
The appropriate KB in the analysis of (7) satisfies Law 7, States
Overlap and Narration. Moreover, the antecedent of Law 7 does not entail
that of States Overlap or Narration, since it does not contain in the
antecedent the formula {a, /?}. But as we have mentioned, the antecedent of
States Overlap entails that of Narration. Law 7 conflicts with States Overlap.
So the premises in the KB form the pattern in Figure 8.
Key
(α, β) Λ win(max, race, me(a))
f\athome(max, me( ))
win(maX) race, me(a))
/\athome(max, me( ))
-iover/ap(Tne(a), me( ))
overlap(me(a)1 me( ))
Fig. 8. Incoherence
By the general principle that more specific overrides less specific, the
rule of Narration is deemed irrelevant here; States Overlap is more specific.
So the example is like the Nixon Diamond: there is irresolvable conflict
between States Overlap and Law 7. Hence as in the Nixon Diamond, we fail
to conclude from the KB that iprec(me(ti)^ me( )), overlap(me(cC), me ( β ) ) or
that ι over lap (me (ti), me ( )). So thanks to the Nixon Diamond, the KB
supports {α, y butfaz/s to support any relation between me(oC) and me (β).
We assume an axiom of consistency on KB s which forms a new assumption
(vi) on the structure of KB s given in section 3:
(vi) Any KB that verifies <a, /?> and fails to verify rel(me(ti), me( )) for
any relation rel in the set of event connections (listed in section 4) is
inconsistent.
We reject all inconsistent KBS. And if a text cannot be processed so as to yield
consistent KBS, then the text is incoherent, i. e. the assumption that <α, β} is
part of the KB must be dropped. Thus (7) is incoherent.
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7.2 Incoherence and discourse popping
We have argued that a text is locally temporally incoherent just in case
the logic for defeasible reasoning refuses to draw a conclusion about
temporal structure, once it has run into an irresolvable conflict of the Nixon
Diamond variety. Lascarides and Asher (1991 a, 1991b) exploit this approach
to local temporal incoherence in their account of discourse popping. In a text
such as (15),
(15) a. Guy experienced a lovely evening last night.
b. He had a great meal.
c. He ate salmon.
d. He devoured lots of cheese.
e. He won a dancing competition.
one attempts to attach the sentence being processed to the text that has been
processed so far. In our current terms, the method they use is to check
whether the sentence currently being processed forms a (locally) temporally
coherent text segment with the previous sentence. So upon processing (15e),
the KB contains the assumption that (15d, e) forms a coherent text segment.
With the relevant defeasible WK and LK the KB runs into an irresolvable
conflict of the Nixon Diamond variety just as we did with text (7). From this,
the conclusion drawn is that (15d, e) does not form a coherent text segment.
Thus (15e) must attach to one of the remaining sentences in (15) which are
open to clause attachment, which in the above case is defined as (15a) and
(15b). Thus the Nixon Diamond is shown to provide an account of local
temporal incoherence, and local temporal incoherence in turn provides the
key to discourse popping.
8. Dudley Doorite, Weakening and Temporal Ambigui ty
We have shown that defeasible WK and LK can be used to infer
temporal structure. A corollary of the approach is that interpretation is
always carried out relative to the reader's KB which, among other things,
contains facts and laws that define the context in which the text is uttered. So
interpretation in this account is reader-specific and context-specific.
This has significant implications for the question of textual ambi-
guity. The assumptions we've made on the KB entail that as long as a text is
coherent, it is also temporally precise. That is, whenever the reader infers that
one of a proper subset of the relations in the set C hold between the
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eventualities described, then there is always sufficient information to choose
which among these plausible alternative temporal structures holds. This is in
contrast to the Nixon Diamond of irresolvable conflict, where no proper
subset of relations in C could be inferred in the first place.
To illustrate this point, consider the following; in the realm of
thermostats, a bimetallic strip's changing shape and a temperature fall are
causally connected, but there is an ambiguity over the direction of the causal
relation. Even so, text (9) on our account is not interpreted as ambiguous.
(9) The bimetallic strip changed shape. The temperature fell.
Because of the order in which the events are described the reader can choose
between the two alternative causal relations (that the bimetallic strip's
change of shape caused the temperature drop, or vice versa). In fact, as Herb
Clark has suggested (personal communication), the reader infers that the
descriptive order in (9) matches temporal order, unless there are contrary
facts already known to the reader.
This interpretation of (9) is explained as follows: the appropriate KB
contains these laws:
Change = Bending or Straightening
change (strip, e) «-> (bend (strip, e) V straighten (strip, e))
Causal Law 9a
<a, /?> Λ bend(strip, me(VL)) Λ fall (temperature, me( )) >
> cause (me '(a), me (β))
Causal Law 9b
<a, /f> Λ straighten (strip, me(ti)) /\ fall (temperature, me (β)) >
> cause (me ( ),me(&))
The antecedents of Law 9a and 9b are not satisfied by the KB in the analysis of
(9). However, Weakening the Consequent and Dudley Doorite can be used
to infer the event structure for (9): Weakening yields Causal Laws 9 a' and 9b'
from 9a and 9b:
Causal Law 9a'
<a, /?> Λ bend (strip, me(oC)) Λ fall (temperature, me( )) >
> cause (me (a), me (β)) V cause (me (β), me (
Causal Law 9b'
<α, β> Λ straighten (strip, me(ti)} r\ fall (temperature, me( ))>
> cause (me (VL), me (β}) V cause (me (β), me(cC))
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Laws 9a' and 9b' then form the premises for Dudley Doorite, and using the
law that a strip changing shape is either a bending or a straightening, we
obtain Law 9c:
Causal Law 9c
<(a, y Λ change (strip, me(ti)) /\ fall (temperature, me (β)) >
> cause (me (a), me (β}) ν cause (me (β), me (a))
The KB satisfies the antecedents to Law 9c and Narration and the former
antecedent entails the latter. But the consequents of Narration and Law 9c
don't conflict. As a result, Defeasible Modus Ponens on Causal Law 9c and on
Narration yield the following:
(16) cause (me (ti), me (β}} ν cause (me (β), m
(17) iprec(me(a)9 me
(16) and (17) together entail cause (me (a), me (/?)); i.e. the strip changing
shape caused the temperature fall. So the temporal structure of (9) inferred is
not ambiguous even if the reader has no information prior to interpreting (9)
about the direction of the causal relation.
A similar story holds for texts that describe an event and then a state.
Suppose one knows from WK that the event and state are causally connected
but one doesn't know the direction of the causal relation. The consequent of
States Overlap is compatible with the state causing the event, but not with
the event causing the state. As a result, a similar pattern of reasoning (that is:
Defeasible Modus Ponens on States Overlap and a Causal Law that follows
from Dudley Doorite and Weakening) yields the inference that the state
caused the event.
Taken together with the assumptions in section 4 about the contents
of the reader's KB, this indicates that a KB will always be such that if the reader
infers a plausible set of alternative temporal structures for a text, she can
always infer which of these alternatives holds. Crucially, information about
textual order is used to choose among these alternatives, via rules like
Narration and States Overlap. On this theory, there is no ambiguity at the
level of interpretation relative to the reader's KB. Ambiguity does arise,
however, at another level. As we've mentioned, a text like (2) can have
different interpretations with respect to different KBS.
(2) Max fell. John pushed him.
We showed that (2) is interpreted as a reversal in the absence of information
to the contrary, but as a narrative if the KB does contain (additional)
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information to the contrary. This is a consequence of using non-monotonic
inference: as context is enriched, the temporal structure inferred relative to
the context may change. So a text is ambiguous in that it receives different
interpretations with respect ot different contexts. In that sense, all the texts
we've mentioned are ambiguous.
9. Defeasible Knowledge and Semantic St ructure
We have deliberately left open the question of how the inference
regime presented here affects the semantic structure of text. This is because at
least three options regarding the semantic structure of text are available,
given that we have imposed conditions so far only on the semantic structure
of sentences.
The first choice is that the semantic structure of text is neutral about
the temporal order of the events it describes, and the defeasible inferences
presented above provide the means of explaining why the reader infers more
than textual semantic structure alone would warrant. Under this proposal,
the logical form of the text is built from the syntactic structure of its
sentences, and the representation of the text α . β would be something like
(18):
(18) α Λ 0 Λ < α , β >
(18) imposes no conditions on the relations between me(ti) and me( \ given
the properties of α and β we have already mentioned. These relations would
be worked out using the reader's knowledge base and defeasible inference.
One can view this option as keeping semantic structure as neutral as
possible, and letting pragmatics, at a "higher" level of interpretation, do
a lot of the work, but not at the sacrifice of formality. The temporal structure
derived from (18) is dependent on the KB being considered, and is therefore
reader-specific and context-specific.
The second option also views the semantic structure of text as being
built from the syntactic structure of its sentences. But this time, each text has
several logical forms, one corresponding to each of the possible event
connections given the syntactic structure of the sentences concerned. Under
this option, the inference regime presented here can be viewed as a way of
choosing among these logical forms, one of which corresponds to the
reader's preferred interpretation, given what she knows. In this way, the
current work can be taken to provide for Hobbs (1985: 6) the required
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formal mechanism for deriving the "best" interpretation from the set of
plausible interpretations. Once again, the choice of which among a large set
of possible interpretations is preferred is reader-specific and context-specific.
A third option is adopted in Lascarides and Asher (1991 a, 1991 b): the
logical form of text is constructed dynamically. This is formalised as follows:
we can view the logical form of text as a pair of sets {01? φ2}·> where φ^ is the
set of logical forms of sentences and φ2 a set of relations between the
eventualities introduced in φΐ. When incorporating the second sentence β of
a text α . β into {{α}, 0} - the logical form of the text so far - β is added to the
first set, and defeasible reasoning as presented in this paper is used to
calculate the relation to be added to the second set. Thus the logical form of
(1) would be {{α, }, {iprec(me(u\ me( ))}} and the logical form of (2)
would be {{a, }, {cause(me(ti)> ^e( ))}}\ they are different in spite of their
similar syntax. This view of dynamically constructing the logical form of
text is explored extensively in Asher (forthcoming), in which φ2 contains
discourse relations rather than temporal relations.
This third option is different from the first two in at least one crucial
respect. The relationship between logical form and syntax is not uniform, as
it was with the first two options. Under those options, the defeasible logic is
a pragmatic mechanism which either augments the semantic structures
passed to it, or chooses between them. But under the third option, the
semantic structure of text itself is dependent on the reader's knowledge,
making the semantic structure of text reader-specific. This contrasts with the
way logical forms are constructed in Kamp and Rohrer (1983), Partee (1984)
and Hinrichs (1986), where the logical form for the whole text is built from
syntax, before any interpretation occurs. Our discussion here has been
neutral; all three options are possible ways of applying the defeasible strategy
outlined in this paper. Our proposal thus opens up a choice as to where to
place the barrier between semantics and pragmatics. But wherever it goes,
formal precision isn't sacrificed.
10. Defeasible Knowledge in Generation
We have examined at length the role defeasible knowledge - about
language and the world - may play in interpretation. Such knowledge can
also play a role in generation. Recall the second question posed at the
beginning of this paper. Given the causal and temporal relations between
events in a knowledge base, what are the ways they can be described in text?
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In fact, there are many ways of describing complex temporal structures, and
Joshi, Webber and Weischedel (1984) exploit default reasoning to choose
between candidate descriptions. A speaker S can generate a set of possible
utterances, and then by using her knowledge of her hearer //, eliminate
utterances where S has reason to believe H will draw a conclusion S knows
to be false. So if S believes that H lacks some defeasible knowledge, S will
eliminate utterances whose coherence, reliability or precision relied on the
use of it.
In the larger context of discourse structure, Oberlander and
Lascarides (1991) discuss various ramifications of this approach to interac-
tive defaults. Here, let us just note the following consequences. Clashing
defaults lead to problems about coherence; missing defaults lead to problems
about reliability and hence precision.
Take the old case where John's pushing Max caused the latter to fall.
Suppose S has a KB which will allow her to generate (2). This text is coherent,
precise and reliable for S because the causal law (about the usual causal
relation between pushings and fallings) is more specific than the linguistic
rule (about Narration). Suppose S knew H to lack the appropriate causal
information. (2) will trigger a different inference pattern in H\ one in which
Narration wins after all. S must block this by changing the utterance. There
are two basic options. If clause order is kept fixed, then S could shift tense
into the pluperfect, as in (19). Alternately S can insert a clue word^ such as
because', into the surface form, and thereby replace (2) with (20). Such a tactic
relies on mutual knowledge of a specific linguistic rule about because.
( 2) Max fell. John pushed him.
(19) Max fell. John had pushed him.
(20) Max fell because John pushed him.
On the other hand, if clause order is not taken to be fixed, then S can simply
reorder the. sentences in (2), and let Narration do the rest. However, there will
be problems with cases involving state-descriptions. In the absence of
appropriate causal laws, temporal overlap will be predicted in cases where it
should not. A solution would be to replace the state expression with an event
expression.
Where clause reordering is permitted, the lack of causal information
will thus have (possibly surprising) ramifications. Here, we end up
restricting S to using event expressions only. However, rather than accept
these restrictions, an obvious move is to introduce further clue words, and
appropriate linguistic rules for reasoning about them. This means exploiting
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LK to overcome the gaps in WK. If S has reason to believe H lacks relevant
WK, but believes H to possess appropriate LK, then S will shift in the ways
specified towards exploiting the latter in her utterances. This may help
explain the proviso made when we first introduced the data about reversals.
Recall the observation that texts which describe events in reverse to
temporal order, without marking the reverse, may be quite rare. It's easy
enough to interpret such texts, when we have the appropriate WK. But if
a considerate speaker or writer has reason to believe that some or all of her
audience lacks that WK, then she will either avoid such descriptive reversals
entirely, or mark them with the type of clues we have discussed.
11. Conclusion
Defeasible reasoning is a useful inference regime. It can be applied to
NLP via causal laws and pragmatic maxims; such knowledge will be useful so
long as inference is formally characterised. The logic can help characterise
temporal coherence and reliability, and explain at least two aspects of
connected temporal discourse. These are reversals (or the lack of them),
explained via the Penguin Principle; and incoherence, explained via the
Nixon Diamond. As part of a more general theory of discourse structure,
such patterns of defeasible inference can therefore constitute elements in an
account of interpretation, and they should also feature in a theory of text
generation based on the strategy of interactive defaults.
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